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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a sizable interest in the return to attending a more selective or prestigious
college. Several studies have tried to identify empirically the private returns to going to a selective
school, with most finding that attending a more prestigious school does indeed have a causal,
positive impact on lifetime earnings. However, there has been little attention as to why. Given
that annual U.S. higher education expenditures are over $460 billion, but per-student expenditures
increase dramatically with college selectivity, understanding why students who attend selective
colleges earn more over their lifetimes has dramatic implications for how those dollars are optimally
allocated (Hoxby 2009; Snyder and Dillow 2011, table 29). The goal of this paper is to propose a
specific mechanism for the college selectivity premium—a model of signaling—that can rationalize
observed behavior.
Several factors make signaling in particular a compelling explanation for the premium. First,
the relatively few studies that have attempted to measure student learning in college have found
little difference across types of colleges once pre-college characteristics are controlled for (Pascarella
and Terenzini 2005; Arum and Roksa 2011). While it is not clear how the “learning” measured
in these studies relates to productivity on the job, this evidence suggests colleges may boost the
wages of their graduates in ways other than through value added. Second, the growing literature on
how employers learn about worker productivity has emphasized that this process is not immediate
but occurs over time, with employers often attempting to learn about an applicant’s latent ability
through measures that are immediately observable, such as education or race. In this context, as
the share of the labor force that are college graduates has risen, it seems reasonable that firms would
sort workers not just through quantity of education but through perceived measures of quality of
education, as well. Finally, and related, human resources and cognitive psychology surveys have
documented that recruiters looking to hire new college graduates not only actively screen applicants
by college attended and grade point average, but that these measures positively correlate with on-
the-job performance (McKinney and Miles 2009). Together, these findings point to the importance
of examining how college selectivity and college grades are jointly determined and how employers
use these measures in wage setting.
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This paper makes two substantive contributions toward understanding the college selectivity
premium. First, it develops a novel, multidimensional signaling model of ability between college
graduate workers and prospective employers. In equilibrium, the utility-maximizing behavior of
these agents leads to a specific—and empirically testable—relationship between the two dimensions
of the signal, college selectivity and grade point average (GPA), and starting wages. While the full
model is elaborate, the crux is intuitive. Students sort into different colleges by ability, which
means that college selectivity is a valuable signal of ability to employers. If graduating from a more
selective school sends a more precise signal of ability than graduating from a less selective school,
the marginal informational benefit of an additional signal, such as GPA, is reduced. When it comes
to wage setting, we would expect the relative weight that firms place on the GPA signal to be lower
at more selective colleges. Consequently, the change in log wages with respect to a change in GPA
should be smaller when selectivity is higher. Furthermore, the ability sorting across college types
also implies that the selectivity premium should fall as GPA rises. The intuition here is that high-
GPA students benefit less from attending a selective school because they have demonstrated their
ability through their GPA; but for a lower-GPA student at a selective college, firms will discount
the noisier signal and place more weight on the college type.
Second, the paper empirically tests the implications of the model. Employing five nationally
representative data sets that span five decades, I consistently find strong support for the predictions
of the signaling model. The return on GPA is lower at selective colleges and falls as the threshold
of selectivity rises. The selectivity premium is highest for those with lower GPAs and declines as
GPA rises. Moreover, both of these phenomena have become more pronounced over time as ability
sorting across colleges has increased.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review some of the recent literature on
the returns to college selectivity and employers learning about workers. Sections 3 and 4 develop,
characterize solutions, and derive predictions for a multidimensional signaling model in the context
of college graduate workers whose productivity firms cannot perfectly observe. Section 5 describes
the data sets and empirical methodology that are used to explore and test the implications of the
model, while Section 6 presents the results of these tests. Section 7 concludes.
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2 College Selectivity Returns and Employer Learning
The earliest studies attempting to measure the return to college selectivity or quality in the U.S.
context date to the early 1970s and are primarily based on a nonrepresentative sample of skilled
(male) World War II military veterans (Wales 1973; Psacharopoulos 1974). Conditioning on ob-
servables (including measures of cognitive ability), these early papers find a sizable wage premium
in midcareer among respondents who attended colleges in the top fifth of the quality distribution.
While Wales discusses several possible explanations for the premium, the data do not allow him to
identify which explanations drive the results. More recent work has taken advantage of more rep-
resentative data and advances in identification methods. Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999) and
Hoxby (2001) attempt to correct for selection on unobservables using nationally representative data,
and find a selectivity premium that appears to have grown over time. Black and Smith (2006) use
NLSY79 data and several approaches for identification, with their preferred GMM method yield-
ing a selectivity premium that is smaller than the earlier studies, but still statistically significant.
Perhaps the most credible identification comes from Hoekstra (2009), who employs regression dis-
continuity designs based on a test cutoff for admission to a (specific) selective college. He finds a
larger premium than in previous work. Dale and Krueger (2002) are unusual in employing a data
set only of students at selective colleges and controlling for the schools to which an individual was
accepted; perhaps as a result, theirs is the only paper to find no wage premium from attending a
more selective college.
Each of these papers tacitly assumes a world of perfect information in which productivity
is directly known by employers, and the objective is to isolate the return to college quality from
the return to latent individual ability. However, there is a growing body of work that suggests
productivity is not immediately known but must be learned over time. This employer learning
literature was begun by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and applied in the (quantity of) education
context by Lange and Topel (2006), Lange (2007), and Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010).
These latter papers conclude that employers learn about the underlying productivity of workers
relatively rapidly, especially in the case of college graduates. However, their findings suggest it is
possible that, by examining earnings several years if not decades after graduation, the return-to-
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college-quality studies conflate the initial premium with revelation of ability or productivity over
time.
The existing theoretical work on the returns to college quality makes similar assumptions of
perfect information. In particular, several papers argue that the concomitant increases in ability
sorting and school resources experienced by higher-ability students can be explained by positive
complementarities in student ability and resources in human capital acquisition (Rothschild and
White 1995; Epple, Romano, and Sieg 2006; Courant, Resch, and Sallee 2008). The basic line of
thinking in these models is that the learning of high-ability students is enhanced when they are
around other high-ability students and resources (better faculty, libraries, etc.), and firms observe
this greater human capital acquisition and pay the students for it. There has been little empirical
evaluation of this class of hypotheses, however, as credible identification is elusive.
More recently, there is a single paper to my knowledge that investigates a signaling mechanism
empirically. Lang and Siniver (2011) examine the return to attending the more selective of two
universities in Israel that have courses taught by common faculty and that share resources. Using
a regression discontinuity design, they find a significant premium to attending the more selective
institution and, given the common faculty and other resources, argue that the result is consistent
with a quality signal framework. However, they acknowledge that they cannot fully control for the
possibility of peer effects, and it is unclear whether their results generalize to the U.S. context,
which has a far greater number of institutions of higher education. Thus, there is ample room for
further work in exploring signaling in the college selectivity context.1
3 A Multidimensional Signaling Model of Latent Ability
Consider the labor market between firms and new college graduates they wish to employ. In the
United States, this labor market is large, with over 1.7 million graduates annually, approximately
75 percent of whom are working full-time one year after graduation (Snyder and Dillow 2011, tables
283 and 404). The market is also well-developed and competitive, as evidenced by the popularity
of career fairs at colleges and geographical mobility of recent graduates (Malamud and Wozniak
1For an empirical investigation of signaling in the quantity of education context, see Bedard (2001).
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2008). Below, I lay out a model that illustrates how signaling can affect the interactions of these
college graduates and firms.
In order to focus on the behavior of students, I assume that firms are homogeneous. Prospec-
tive workers (i.e., students), on the other hand, vary in their ability, η ∼ N(0, 1), and this trait
affects the worker’s productivity to firms.2 While students can observe their own ability, the firms
cannot. Instead, in the spirit of Spence (1973), the firms observe imperfect signals of ability that are
chosen by the students. These signals, for example, might appear on a potential worker’s résumé,
be transmitted during a job interview, or appear in the form of references or letters of recommenda-
tion. While there may be many such signals, two of note are the undergraduate grade point average
(GPA), and the prestige, reputation, or selectivity (SEL) of the degree-granting college. Because
most new college graduates have limited prior working experience, both of these measures tend to
feature prominently in their résumés, which often serve as the first set of information observed by
firms when hiring new workers.3
Employers care about these signals because they can be used to form expectations about a
worker’s productivity. Using this information set, the firm offers a wage to the worker based on
its beliefs. From the perspective of a student, increasing the value of these signals is costly—and
more costly for those of lower ability—but doing so makes the individual look more productive to
prospective employers, and thus can increase the anticipated wage offer. The behaviors of these
agents are described more formally below.
3.1 Firm’s Problem
Let the production function of a new worker i at time t be given by
ln yit = ait + ρtηit + εit, (1)
2Ability as used here need not be thought of purely as cognitive ability, but a combination of cognitive and noncognitive
abilities mapped to a single dimension. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) show in their Table S3 that measures
of cognitive and noncognitive ability are positively correlated.
3McKinney and Miles (2009) review several studies that validate the use of these signals by recruiters at col-
leges. Indeed, college career office Web sites highlight the importance of these two pieces of information by sug-
gesting they feature most prominently on the résumé (http://www.careercenter.umich.edu/students/resume/
sectionexplanations.html). This is consistent with most hiring comprising a multistage process, with the first
stage consisting of an initial screening of the résumé.
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where ln y is the natural logarithm of output. The individual-specific intercept ait represents
characteristics about worker i other than ability that affect productivity (e.g., through type of job),
that may vary over time due to changes in technology or discrimination, and that are observable
to both the firm and the econometrician. These characteristics include features such as the major
or field of study at college, race, and sex. The scaling factor ρt is a positive parameter that
measures how closely ability, ηit, is related to productivity and may also vary over time as the
importance of skill (or ability) in production changes. Finally, εit is a normally distributed random
disturbance term that is meant to capture other individual characteristics independent of ability
that influence productivity (e.g., luck, random match quality) that are observable to the firm but
not the econometrician.
The objective of the firm is to set a wage policy in order to maximize expected profits from
a new college graduate worker. Competition among firms, however, ensures that profits are zero in
expectation, and so
wit(GPAit, SELit) = ait + ρtE[ηit | GPAit, SELit] + εit, (2)
where wit represents log wages. The firm’s wage schedule depends on how it forms an expectation
of a worker’s ability given both the GPA and selectivity signals, and this will be a function of
optimal student behavior.
3.2 Student’s Problem
The student faces a two-stage problem. In the first stage, which occurs during high school, she is
concerned with the type, or selectivity, of college she will attend. (As the labor market of interest
is new college graduate workers, the effective student population includes only those who graduate
from college and then enter the workforce.) For simplicity, suppose there are two types of colleges,
indexed by j and denoted selective (j = 1) and less selective (j = 0), respectively. While admission
to the less selective type is guaranteed, entrance to selective schools is competitive and requires
effort, e1 ∈ [0,∞), from the student.
Let P (e1) equal the probability of getting into college type j = 1 given effort level e1. The
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function P (·) is described by
P (e1) =

ε if e1 < ẽ1
f(e1); f
′(e1) > 0, f
′′(e1) < 0, lime1→∞ f(e1) = 1 if e1 ≥ ẽ1.
(3)
For effort levels below some threshold ẽ1, the probability of admittance into the selective tier of
colleges is fixed at ε, which is assumed to be close to zero.4 Only for effort levels above ẽ1 does
the likelihood of admittance begin to increase, and in a concave fashion. The probability function
thus allows for non-smooth returns to effort, as might be the case under certain admit/reject rules
at selective colleges (Toor 2001).
Effort, which here can be thought of as the time and energy put into studying during high
school, is costly. However, students find exerting a given amount of effort less costly the greater is








where α1, α2, and α3 are each positive constants.
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In the second stage, the student has observed the admission outcome and knows what type
of college she will attend.6 At the chosen college type, she must again decide how hard to work,
e2 ∈ [0,∞), but this time the outcome of interest is her grade point average (GPA), a summary
measure of academic performance. GPA is an affine function of effort, but there is a random noise
additive component as well. This error term is independent of effort (and ability) and may reflect
personality matches between the student and the professor, arbitrary grading, or simple luck. Thus,
GPA(e2) = γ1 + γ2e2 + ν; ν ∼ N(0, σ2ν), (5)
where γ1 and γ2 are positive constants. In writing the GPA-effort relationship this way I have made
4The ε term is a simplification meant to capture students who may gain entry to selective schools through non-
academically competitive means, such as legacies and scholarship athletes.
5The value of α1 is such that η + α1 > 0 for all but a trivially small range of η.
6In equilibrium, there is a wage premium from attending the selective type, and students’ beliefs behave accordingly.
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two assumptions. First, GPA is related linearly to effort. This is problematic in the sense that GPA
is typically measured on a bounded 4-point scale and equation (5) allows for an unbounded GPA.
However, as long as optimal effort levels are in a suitably restricted range, the unboundedness issue
should not be a major concern.7 Second, the GPA function is independent of college type. It turns
out the qualitative implications of the model are not affected by this restriction (see Appendix B),
and so I proceed for now under (5).





where δ1 and δ2 are each positive constants.
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Combining both stages, the student’s objective can be written
Maxe1,e2 Ui = w (SEL(e1), GPA(e2))− C1(e1; η)− C2(e2; η), (7)
where w is the log wage earned conditional on GPA and SEL, an indicator variable for whether
j = 1, and the η subscripts in the cost functions reflect their dependence on a student’s ability.9
3.3 Solution Characteristics
The student’s problem can be solved with backward induction, beginning with the second stage.









The student equates the marginal cost of exerting effort with the marginal benefit of higher wages
resulting from a higher grade point average. The student’s belief of how the wage offer changes
7Related is that the boundedness of GPA implies ν is not strictly independent of effort. Empirically, this seems to be
trivial, however, with approximately 1 percent of individuals recording the maximum 4.0 GPA. As such, I treat this
issue as ignorable.
8The value of δ1 is such that η + δ1 > 0 for all but a trivially small range of η.
9Equation (7) assumes students are risk neutral. In Appendix C, I briefly sketch how behavior changes when agents
are risk-averse.
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with GPA, and how this relationship may differ by college selectivity, is key to determining optimal
effort. If the belief is that wage changes linearly with GPA, then ∂w(·)∂GPA
∣∣∣
SEL=j
is a constant (which
may differ for j = {0, 1}), and optimal effort rises linearly with a student’s ability.10 This leads to
the common-sense prediction that, within a school type, average GPA should be higher among the
higher-ability students.





























under the assumption that ∂w(·)∂GPA
∣∣∣
SEL=j
is a constant kj . (I discuss the empirical validity of this
assumption, as well as the linearity of GPA in ability, in Appendix C.)
Returning to the first stage, although the GPA function is unrelated to college type, there
may be complementarity between the two stages if k0 6= k1. Suppose, for example, that k0 > k1.
Then an individual with ability ηi will expend more effort in the second stage at a less selective
college than at a selective one, and earn a higher expected GPA. The situation would be reversed if
k1 > k0. Acknowledging this possible complementarity, the first-order condition for the first stage
is








0 if α2η+α1 +
α3ẽ1
η+α1
> f ′(ẽ1) (w(E[GPAj=1,η], SELj=1)− w(E[GPAj=0,η], SELj=0))
e∗1
∣∣∣ α2η+α1 + α3e∗1η+α1 = f ′(e∗1) (w(E[GPAj=1,η], SELj=1)− w(E[GPAj=0,η], SELj=0)) , else.
Because the transition to a different selectivity college is possibly associated with a change in
expected GPA, the return to moving from a less selective to more selective institution is not simply
the partial derivative (technically, discrete change) of log wages with respect to selectivity but must
include the expected change in GPA as well. In the first-order condition, this return is expressed
10Optimal effort e∗2 is rising in η as long as
∂w(·)
∂GPA





as the discrete change in the wage as both arguments change, and it is multiplied by the change
in probability of admission that comes with increased effort. For a (unique) interior solution to
exist, this probability-weighted return must be at least equal to the marginal cost of effort at the
threshold ẽ1, where the likelihood of admission begins to rise.
The solution can perhaps best be explained graphically, as in Figure 1. For the sake of
exposition, the figure plots marginal cost and benefit curves for three ability types: high (ηH),
medium (ηM ), and low (ηL). Equation (4) implies that that marginal cost of effort has both the
slope and intercept decreasing in ability. The marginal benefit curves (dashed) capture the expected
return to moving from a less to more selective institution, weighted by the change in admission
probability from increased effort. For effort levels less than ẽ1, there is no change in admission
probability from increasing effort, and so the marginal benefit curve has a value of zero. For higher
effort levels, the concavity of f(·), the probability of admission to the selective tier, ensures that the
marginal benefit curves are downward sloping. It remains, though, to characterize the net return
from moving from a less selective to a more selective college.
Notably, for a fixed ability level, the expected return from switching selectivity levels is a
constant, since the expected GPA arguments in the wage equation are themselves constants by
second stage optimization. However, across ability levels, this expected return will vary. Since
the difference in expected GPA between selectivity tiers is larger the higher is ability,11 higher-
ability types experience a larger change in the net return from the GPA component when switching
selectivity tiers. If k1 < k0, higher-ability types enjoy a smaller expected wage gain when moving
to the more selective tier. This effectively lowers the slope of the marginal benefit curve, as shown
in Figure 1. (If, instead, k1 = k0, the marginal benefit curves would be identical across ability, and
if k1 > k0, the slope of the marginal benefit curve would become steeper as ability rises.)
Three things bear mentioning. First, students below some ability threshold (denoted η̃ and
implicitly defined by equation (10)) do not find it worthwhile to expend any effort in the first stage.
(This characterization is shown for ηL in the figure.) Only a trivial fraction of these students (ε
of them) will be admitted and attend the selective tier of colleges. Second, for students above


















this threshold, optimal effort is rising in ability under relatively weak conditions.12 Third, the
threshold η̃ is rising in ẽ. (Appendix A provides proofs.) The first two features together imply that
the likelihood of gaining admission (and attending) selective schools is rising in ability. The third
feature implies, sensibly, that when more effort is required to increase the probability of gaining
admittance to selective schools, only increasingly higher-ability students will find it worthwhile to
do so.
4 Firm Expectations of Student Ability and Predictions
4.1 Moment Expectations
For a given η̃ the features described above lead to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Mean ability is higher at more selective schools.
12Marginal cost must decline in ability faster than does the wage premium from the endogenous reduction in expected
GPA.
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Proposition 2: A higher ability threshold, η̃, leads to a larger difference in mean ability
between more and less selective schools.13
Proposition 3: A higher ability threshold, η̃, leads to a lower variance in ability at more
selective schools.
Proposition 4: Variance in ability is lower at more selective schools when η̃ > 0.
Proofs: Appendix A.2.
Intuitively, because students who attempt selective entry are of higher average ability than those
who do not, selective colleges will have higher-ability students on average. Furthermore, raising
the ability threshold for applying must amplify the average ability gap, as the applicant pool for
selective colleges will shrink proportionately more than the less selective pool will grow.
It also follows that the variance of ability, conditional on the student having graduated from
the selective tier, is falling in η̃. This occurs nearly mechanically; a higher minimum threshold
reduces the fraction of the student population who find it worthwhile to exert effort in the first
stage, and so the conditional variance falls as a result. More generally, it is not necessarily the case
that the variance of ability at the selective tier is smaller than at the less selective tier for all values
of η̃. When η̃ > 0 this will necessarily be true, as less than half the ability distribution “applies” to
the selective schools and not all of them will get in. When η̃ < 0, whether the conditional variance
is smaller at the selective tier will depend on the shape of f(·), which will affect the skewness of
ability distributions across school types. However, in the data used in this study, far fewer than
half of the eventual college graduates reported applying to the selective tier, so it seems reasonable
that η̃ > 0 and the variance of ability is smaller at the selective tier.
How do firms incorporate both selectivity and GPA into their expectations? Recall that an
optimizing student’s GPA is linear in η plus a normally distributed, independent error term. If
η is normally distributed, conditional on selectivity, then GPA, as the sum of two independent
normal random variables, is normally distributed as well, and GPA and η are jointly distributed
as bivariate normal. As documented by Aigner and Cain (1977), among others, this would imply
13This assumes the factors that brought about the change in η̃ were exogenous; see Hoxby (2009) and Section 4.3 below
for evidence to this effect.
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that the conditional expectation of ability given selectivity and GPA is of the form







The conditional expectation of ability given both selectivity and GPA is linear in GPA, with both
the slope and intercept varying by selectivity tier.14
It follows from equation (2) that log wages at a given time (t subscript suppressed) are given
by




















where ψj is a function of the structural parameters that depends on j, and σ
2
ηj is the variance in



















It was assumed earlier that, according to students’ beliefs,
∂wij
∂GPAij
= kj . In the context of (13), a


















≡ h(kj) = kj . (14)
Since h(·) is continuous in kj , is plausibly bounded on a closed interval, and maps to its own domain
by assumption, kj exists by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
16
14Of course, bivariate normality is unlikely to hold exactly, as the necessary sorting by ability would occur only under
a specific f(·). Yet this assumption may not be a poor one. If the distribution of η is reasonably close to normal at
both selectivity tiers, then GPA at each tier should be approximately normal as well. In Appendix Figures 1 through





















, with ζj ≡ γ42k2j δ−22 .
16Uniqueness is another matter. The careful reader will note that the trivial solution kj = 0 satisfies (14). However, it
can be shown that for values of σ2ηj that accord with the empirical sample moments (Table 1) and plausible, bounded
values of σ2ν (Appendix C.3), (14) produces unique, strictly positive values.
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4.2 Cross-sectional Predictions




η0 , by (14) k1 6= k0. Yet, the same equation makes
it possible, for certain parameter values, for either k1 > k0 or k1 < k0. It turns out, however,
that any possible equilibrium with k1 > k0 cannot be supported as a (perfect Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium. Suppose k1 > k0, such that the return on GPA is higher at selective colleges. Then
firms must believe that, on average, the increase in ability from a one-point rise in GPA is higher
at selective colleges than at less selective colleges. But it has already been shown that the variance
in ability is smaller at selective colleges. (Indeed, this is verified empirically in Table 1.) With a
smaller variance in ability, but a fixed GPA range, it is not rational to believe that a unit change
in GPA corresponds to a larger increase in ability at selective colleges. Therefore, k1 > k0 is not a
valid equilibrium.17 Thus the only surviving equilibrium has k1 < k0. This leads to the following
prediction:
PREDICTION 1: The return on GPA should be higher at less selective schools than at more
selective schools.
Moreover, if the threshold η̃ is increased, the resulting variance in ability at selective schools, σ2η1 ,
will be smaller. As σ2ν and other parameters remain unchanged, however, the strength of the GPA
signal at selective schools will decline further, and thus so will k1 relative to k0.
18 Thus, there exists
the next prediction.
PREDICTION 2: As the selectivity threshold becomes more restrictive (η̃ increases), the differ-
ence in the GPA returns between less selective and more selective schools should increase.
By taking equation (12) and differencing between selective and less selective colleges and then
taking the derivative with respect to GPA, one can show that the selectivity premium is a linear
function of GPA with slope k1 − k0. Since it has been argued that k1 < k0, there is another
17For k1 to be greater than k0, the necessary condition is that the ratio of the ability-GPA covariance to the variance
of GPA is larger at more selective schools (see equation (11)). This is strongly rejected in every data set. It can also
be shown using equation (14) that kj falls when σ
2
ηj does.





PREDICTION 3: The selectivity premium is falling in GPA whenever k1 < k0.
4.3 Trend Predictions
In addition to generating these predictions in a cross-section, the model can also be used to in-
vestigate the integration of the college market over the past 40 years that has been thoroughly
documented by Hoxby (2009). In effect, reductions in communication, transportation, and infor-
mation costs have nationalized (or even globalized) the college market in a way that has allowed
selective colleges to become more discriminating about which students they accept. In the context
of the model, the measure of the student population has increased faster than the supply of slots
at selective colleges. For the market to clear, the “price” of admission also needs to have risen,
or, put differently, the minimum first-stage effort threshold, ẽ, has increased.19 But, as was shown
earlier, a rise in ẽ leads to a higher η̃, and this in turn yields a higher conditional expectation and
lower conditional variance of ability at selective schools.


















]2 > 0. (15)
Since σ2η1 should be falling, this implies that the return on GPA at more selective colleges should
decline as ability sorting increases.
Additionally, Murnane Willett, and Levy (1995) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), among
others, have documented a rising return to skill or ability since the 1980s. In the context of the
model, this corresponds to a rise in ρt, the association between ability and productivity. While
equation (14) clearly shows that the return on GPA is rising in ρ, it should be noted that the
effect is more pronounced the larger is kj . It follows that the return on GPA should have increased
19Bound, Hershbein, and Long (2009) discuss these changes in more detail and provide extensive evidence that measures
of high school effort have increased greatly among those who attend and apply to selective colleges. They also show
that in the absence of this increased effort, the probability of admission to selective colleges would have fallen over
time.
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faster at less selective schools than at more selective schools. Combining the changes in σ2η1 and ρ
produces the final prediction:
PREDICTION 4: The difference in the return on GPA at less selective and more selective schools
should grow larger over time.
5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.1 Data
To test the implications derived above, I use three panel surveys of students conducted by the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics: the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class
of 1972 (NLS72), the High School and Beyond (HSB), and the National Education Longitudinal
Study (NELS). These data are supplemented by two additional data sets: Project Talent (PT) and
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 (NLSY97). Each of these nationally representa-
tive data sets tracks students beginning in secondary school, following them through postsecondary
education and the transition into the workforce. They contain detailed information on postsec-
ondary schools attended, degrees earned, course grades, and job characteristics. They also contain
the results of an aptitude test battery administered to the students during adolescence, typically
the senior year of high school; this score can be used as a measure of ability.20 Importantly, the
restricted-access versions of these data sets, used in this paper, allow the identification of all post-
secondary institutions attended and, for the NCES data, have complete postsecondary transcript
data for students who reported attending a postsecondary institution. Each survey is similar in
scope and types of questions asked but covers cohorts roughly 10 years apart—college graduates
in the mid 1960s (PT), late 1970s (NLS72), late 1980s (HSB), late 1990s (NELS), and mid-to-late
2000s (NLSY97). They thus facilitate analyses for pooled cohorts that span 40 years and longitu-
dinal analyses across cohorts.21 The data appendix discusses the sampling frame of these surveys
in more detail.
20As these were low-stakes tests, the ability measure picks up both non-cognitive as well as cognitive abilities.
21I have also performed cross-sectional analysis separately for each cohort. Point estimates are qualitatively similar to
those reported in this paper, although they are less precise.
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As the focus of analysis is new college graduate workers, in each data set the sample is re-
stricted to individuals who earned their bachelor’s degrees at U.S. institutions within six years of
high school graduation and began a job after earning their bachelor’s degree.22 Furthermore, at
the time of beginning their post-college graduation job, they must have earned no additional (grad-
uate) degree, not have been enrolled in school, been working for pay with real (year 2005) hourly
earnings between 5 and 100 dollars, and have been neither self-employed nor in the military. Last,
college GPA and the bachelor-degree-granting institution must be identifiable for the respondent.23
Appendix Table 1 contains more detailed information on how the restrictions affect the sample size
for each data set.
Empirical analysis of the theoretical model described in Sections 3 and 4 rests on a practical
measure of college selectivity. The primary measure of college selectivity used in this paper is
drawn from the competitiveness index from Barron’s Profile of American Colleges (1984, 1992).
Each year, Barron’s classifies nearly all four-year colleges and universities in the country into six
categories according to their admissions selectivity. The criteria used to classify colleges includes
median ACT or SAT scores for the most recent freshman class, minimum grade point averages and
high school class rank required for admission, and the acceptance rate for applicants to the most
recent freshman class. Using an electronic data set of the Barron’s rankings for the years 1972,
1982, 1992, and 2004 that was created by Bastedo and Jaquette (2009), I create three different
binary indicators for college selectivity for each of the five data sets. The first of these indicator
variables is coded as 1 if the college is ranked in Barron’s top three categories and 0 otherwise
(Tier I); the second is coded as 1 if the college is ranked in Barron’s top two categories and 0
otherwise (Tier II); and the third is coded as 1 if the college is ranked in Barron’s top category
and 0 otherwise (Tier III). Note that these three tiers are nested; Figure 2 provides examples of
colleges in each selectivity tier. The 1972 rankings are used for Project Talent and NLS72 (or 1974
when 1972 rankings are unavailable), the 1982 rankings for HSB, the 1992 rankings for NELS, and
22For students who transfer colleges, the bachelor degree-granting institution is used. Gill and Leigh (2003) find no
wage differences among bachelor degree recipients who began at two- or four-year colleges.
23College GPA is generally taken directly from transcripts and from self-reports when not transcripts were not available.
See the data appendix for details.
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the 2004 rankings for NLSY97.24
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Some summary statistics of the estimation samples from each data set can be found in Table
1. A detailed description of these variables is found in the data appendix. In each data set, average
log wages of the post-graduation job typically rise with the selectivity of the institution attended,
with this gradient getting steeper over time. Average grades also consistently rise with selectivity,
but by much less than does either proxy for ability (SAT/ACT percentile or senior test score), which
is consistent with k1 < k0. Additionally, not only is the variance in either ability measure falling
as selectivity rises, but, consistent with the predictions of the model and the empirical argument
of Hoxby (2009), this becomes more pronounced over time.
24The rankings tend to be fairly consistent over time. The data appendix describes an alternative college selectivity
measure that does not vary over time, and results using this measure are discussed later as a robustness check.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Panel A: Pooled
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.966 0.509 3.051 0.505 3.134 0.485 3.232 0.437
Barron's  Tier I: 0.305 0.460 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.105 0.307 0.344 0.475 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.031 0.174 0.103 0.304 0.299 0.458 1.000 0.000
Female 0.574 0.495 0.550 0.498 0.522 0.501 0.515 0.501
Black 0.055 0.228 0.034 0.183 0.040 0.195 0.061 0.240
Other race 0.054 0.226 0.067 0.250 0.074 0.262 0.087 0.282
Real wage ($2005) 14.48 7.204 15.58 8.360 16.40 9.810 17.20 11.010
Full-time 0.856 0.351 0.842 0.364 0.810 0.392 0.785 0.412
SAT/ACT percentile 55.6 25.3 68.0 21.5 76.4 19.0 84.2 15.6




Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.624 0.480 2.640 0.514 2.628 0.467 2.565 0.273
Barron's  Tier I: 0.247 0.431 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.047 0.213 0.192 0.394 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.004 0.065 0.017 0.131 0.090 0.288 1.000 0.000
Female 0.591 0.492 0.606 0.489 0.517 0.502 0.300 0.481
Black 0.014 0.116 0.004 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other race 0.011 0.103 0.008 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Real wage ($2005) 13.88 4.454 14.78 4.412 14.60 3.828 13.69 4.290
Full-time 0.924 0.265 0.930 0.255 0.911 0.286 0.715 0.260
SAT/ACT percentile — — — — — — — —
Senior test score 0.629 0.758 1.142 0.584 1.195 0.666 1.698 0.260
Observations
Panel C: NLS72
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.955 0.478 2.981 0.502 3.012 0.525 3.043 0.503
Barron's  Tier I: 0.209 0.407 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.053 0.224 0.254 0.435 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.009 0.094 0.043 0.203 0.170 0.377 1.000 0.000
Female 0.515 0.500 0.476 0.500 0.476 0.501 0.459 0.510
Black 0.064 0.244 0.050 0.219 0.058 0.235 0.124 0.337
Other race 0.046 0.210 0.065 0.247 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000
Real wage ($2005) 14.42 6.857 14.71 6.776 14.94 5.779 15.15 7.219
Full-time 0.879 0.327 0.878 0.328 0.928 0.260 0.843 0.373
SAT/ACT percentile 53.9 26.2 67.6 22.4 75.9 21.9 83.2 20.0
Senior test score 0.740 0.751 1.067 0.667 1.366 0.621 1.498 0.559
Observations 2803 554 138 22
2025 490 122 11
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
8637 2404 815 231
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Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, cont’d
Panel D: HSB
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.955 0.471 2.973 0.441 3.040 0.440 3.148 0.414
Barron's  Tier I: 0.254 0.436 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.105 0.306 0.411 0.493 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.029 0.169 0.115 0.320 0.280 0.451 1.000 0.000
Female 0.575 0.495 0.559 0.497 0.580 0.496 0.414 0.500
Black 0.066 0.248 0.041 0.199 0.056 0.231 0.125 0.336
Other race 0.054 0.225 0.056 0.230 0.045 0.209 0.031 0.175
Real wage ($2005) 12.33 7.579 13.49 9.800 14.85 12.211 14.08 4.749
Full-time 0.826 0.379 0.802 0.399 0.741 0.441 0.814 0.395
SAT/ACT percentile — — — — — — — —
Senior test score 0.732 0.802 1.145 0.652 1.330 0.538 1.709 0.504
Observations
Panel E: NELS
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 2.994 0.472 3.036 0.462 3.076 0.468 3.093 0.480
Barron's  Tier I: 0.336 0.472 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.134 0.341 0.398 0.490 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.044 0.206 0.132 0.339 0.332 0.472 1.000 0.000
Female 0.576 0.494 0.515 0.500 0.463 0.499 0.490 0.502
Black 0.062 0.241 0.033 0.180 0.039 0.193 0.065 0.247
Other race 0.093 0.290 0.131 0.338 0.155 0.362 0.118 0.325
Real wage ($2005) 17.99 8.178 20.29 9.741 22.23 12.298 24.91 16.674
Full-time 0.934 0.248 0.945 0.228 0.934 0.248 0.951 0.216
SAT/ACT percentile 54.8 24.4 68.2 20.6 77.2 18.4 86.5 12.6
Senior test score 0.758 0.727 1.047 0.652 1.279 0.536 1.543 0.373
Observations
Panel F: NLSY97
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
GPA 3.313 0.392 3.351 0.361 3.397 0.344 3.422 0.308
Barron's  Tier I: 0.483 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's Tier II: 0.189 0.392 0.391 0.489 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Barron's  Tier III: 0.071 0.258 0.148 0.355 0.378 0.487 1.000 0.000
Female 0.613 0.487 0.575 0.495 0.547 0.499 0.594 0.495
Black 0.072 0.258 0.041 0.197 0.036 0.186 0.028 0.164
Other race 0.068 0.252 0.059 0.236 0.060 0.237 0.106 0.308
Real wage ($2005) 13.74 7.128 14.15 7.399 13.90 5.736 14.04 5.006
Full-time 0.710 0.454 0.728 0.445 0.699 0.460 0.662 0.477
SAT/ACT percentile 58.6 24.9 68.2 21.6 75.9 18.3 82.2 16.9
Senior test score 0.810 0.758 1.044 0.709 1.253 0.660 1.308 0.732
Observations
Tier III
829 379 147 56
1078 264 98 33
Notes: Statistics shown  are weighted using sampling weights provided in the data. GPA is measured on a four point scale (0 to 4). Senior test 
scores follow a standard normal distribution (among high school seniors) within each dataset. The number of observations for SAT/ACT 
percentile and Senior test score are less than that shown, as not all sample individuals had these measures (SAT/ACT percentile unavailable in 
PT and HSB). See Data Appendix for variable construction.
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
1902 717 310 109
All Tier I Tier II
Table 1: Summ ry Statistics of Selected V riables, cont'd
All Tier I Tier II Tier III
Note: Statistics shown are weighted using sampling weights provided in the data. GPA is measured on a
4-point scale (0 to 4). Senior test scores follow a standard normal distribution (among high school seniors)
within each data set. The number of observations for SAT/ACT percentile and Senior test score are less
than that shown, as not all sample individuals had these measures (SAT/ACT percentile unavailable in PT
and HSB). See data appendix for variable construction.
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5.2 Methodology
In order to test Predictions 1–3, I estimate the following reduced-form of equation (12) separately
for each selectivity tier threshold using the pooled data:






λXDdXid + εid, (16)
where wid is the logarithm of the hourly wage of worker i from data set d, GPA is the college
grade point average, S is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual graduated from
a selective college and 0 if she did not, Dd is a dummy for each data set, and Xid is a vector of
dummies for sex, race, and college major. The interaction between Dd and Xid allow the effect of
sex, race, and college major to vary across each data set and capture the ait term in equation (1).
25
Because graduates of the same college presumably had access to similar resources in searching for
their post-graduate jobs (e.g., the same career office on campus), the idiosyncratic error εid may be
correlated among these students; variance estimation thus allows for this arbitrary within-college
correlation.
Except for the addition of the GPA variables, equation (16) appears similar to many of the
estimating equations used in the literature on the return to college quality. The parameter θ2
represents the (approximate) percent increase in wages resulting from a one-point increase in GPA
at a less selective college, and θ3 represents the same at a selective college. According to Prediction
1, θ2 > θ3. Moreover, as the threshold for selectivity grows higher, Prediction 2 posits that the
difference between θ2 and θ3 should be larger. In practice, this means that we would expect θ̂2− θ̂3
to be larger when estimated for Tier II than for Tier I (and similarly for Tier III than for Tier II).
The return to selectivity in equation (16) can vary by GPA, something that earlier work
in the return to college quality did not allow. Specifically, the return to selectivity is given by
θ1 − (θ2 − θ3)GPA. Prediction 3 implies that, since θ2 − θ3 > 0, the return to selectivity falls as
GPA rises, but that it should remain weakly positive at the maximum GPA.
25For consistency across data sets, race is coded as white, black, or other; and college major consists of 11 categories:
humanities, social sciences, psychology, life sciences, physical sciences and mathematics, engineering, education,
business, arts, health, and other.
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Furthermore, Prediction 4 argued that increasing ability-sorting across colleges and returns
to skill should intensify the first three predictions. To test this hypothesis, I divide the data into an
“early” period consisting of the data sets from the 1960s and 1970s and a “late” period consisting
of the data from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. (This division accords with the findings of growing
returns to skill that began in the 1980s and also balances sample sizes.) I then estimate
wid =θ0 + θ11Sid + θ12SidLateid + θ21GPAid(1− Sid) + θ22GPAid(1− Sid)Lateid (17)







where Lateid equals 1 if the individual is from the HSB, NELS, or NLSY97 data sets, and 0
otherwise. In this equation, θ21 gives the return on GPA at less selective schools in the early
period, θ21 + θ22 gives the return on GPA at less selective schools in the late period, θ31 gives the
return on GPA at more selective schools in the early period, and θ31+θ32 gives the return on GPA at
more selective schools in the late period. The return to selectivity is given by θ11− (θ21− θ31)GPA
in the early period, and by θ11 +θ12−((θ21 + θ22)− (θ31 + θ32))GPA in the late period. Prediction
4 asserts that θ22 > θ32, which implies that the return on GPA has grown faster at less selective




Table 2 presents the results from estimating equation (16) on the pooled data. Columns 1–3 use
selectivity tier I, II, and III, respectively, on the entire eligible sample, while columns 4–6 repeat
the analysis on the full-time worker sample. At less selective colleges, the return on GPA is highly
significant at about 9 percent for the whole sample, regardless of the selectivity threshold. However,
these returns are uniformly smaller at selective colleges, and for tier II and tier III colleges, the
returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Of course, the standard errors tend to be much
larger for the selective college GPA estimates, especially at the higher tiers, because the effective
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sample sizes are so much smaller. Consequently, the null hypothesis that the returns on GPA
are the same across selectivities cannot be rejected at conventional levels in columns 1 through 3.
Nonetheless, the point estimates are fairly close to 0 for selective colleges in columns 2 and 3.
Table 2: Log Hourly Wages on GPA by Selectivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Sel. Dummy @ GPA=3.0 0.075*** 0.097*** 0.145*** 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.128***
[0.015] [0.025] [0.039] [0.014] [0.022] [0.037]
GPA, less-selective 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.103***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012]
GPA, selective 0.069*** 0.023 0.011 0.071*** 0.035 0.016
[0.023] [0.047] [0.069] [0.021] [0.035] [0.077]
p-val for diff 0.326 0.144 0.261 0.079 0.045 0.263
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.236 0.235 0.262 0.260 0.259
Controls for sex, race, and
college major?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights and data pooled across all data
sets. The dependent variable in each column is the real log hourly wage. Standard errors (in brackets) are
robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
For the full-time sample, the patterns are remarkably similar. Less selective college graduates
earn a GPA return of 10 to 11 percent, but graduates from selective colleges do not enjoy the same
benefit from a higher GPA. A graduate of a tier I (or higher) school earns only 0.073 log points per
point increase in GPA, and this return is statistically less than that at non-tier-I schools at the 10
percent level. The GPA returns fall monotonically as the selectivity threshold increases to tier II
and tier III. The return at tier II is one-third the size of less selective schools’, and the difference
is statistically significant at 5 percent. The tier III gap is even more dramatic, although it is not
as precisely estimated.
The pattern of these coefficients and the magnitude of their differences are striking. Fur-
thermore, these results are reasonably robust to the specific definition of selectivity. Panel A of
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Appendix Table 2, for example, repeats Table 2 using an alternative measure of selectivity sug-
gested by Black and Smith (2006) that is based on college inputs. The table shows similar, if
noisier, patterns. The data therefore confirm Predictions 1 and 2.26
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Figure 7: Selectivit  premium, by GPA 





Notes: Line markers indicate point-wise statistical significance against a null of 0 at the 5 percent level.  
The selectivity return is statistically significantly different (at 5 percent) for any two GPA values for the 1960s-2000s  
sample and the 1980s-2000s sample, but not the 1960s-1970s sample. 
GPA 
Note: Line markers indicate pointwise statistical significance against a null of 0 at the 5 percent
level. The selectivity return is statistically significantly different (at 5 percent) for any two GPA
values for the 1960s–2000s sample and the 1980s–2000s sample, but not the 1960s–1970s sample.
Although Table 2 shows that the selectivity premium estimate is positive and statistically
significant at the mean GPA of 3.0, the return on selectivity implied by equation (16) is best shown
graphically. Figure 3 plots the selectivity return (in log points) against GPA for full-time workers
using the tier II definition (column 5 of Table 2), although using the sample of all workers or other
selectivity thresholds does not appreciably change the picture. Since θ̂2 > θ̂3, the selectivity return
slopes downward. Looking at the pooled 1960s–2000s sample, students with a GPA of 2.0, around
26I have also estimated variants of (16) that interact selectivity with the controls for sex, race, and major. These
interaction coefficients typically are small and statistically insignificant for sex and race, although the returns to
social sciences, physical sciences, and engineering (relative to humanities) are larger at selective schools. Allowing
these interactions, however, has minimal effect on the GPA estimates presented above.
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the 5th percentile of the pooled sample, earn 0.14 log points more at their first job if they graduated
from a selective college, and the marker at this point indicates that this premium is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. The premium is reduced to about 7 percent at the sample mean
GPA of 2.97, and although it remains positive for the rest of the GPA distribution, it ceases to
be statistically different from zero at GPAs above 3.2. Perhaps more important, one can reject
that the selectivity premium is the same for any two different GPA points; thus, the 0.14 log point
premium at a GPA of 2.0 is not only different from the 0.07 log point premium at a GPA of 3.0,
it is also different from the premium of 0.13 at a GPA of 2.2.27 This confirms Prediction 3 and
provides further support for the signaling model.
6.2 The Model Over Time
Both the rising return to ability and increased ability sorting at colleges should serve to widen
the gap in GPA returns between selective and less selective colleges (equation (15)). This is tested
formally in Table 3, which is similar to Table 2 but provides estimates separately for the 1960s–1970s
and 1980s–2000s periods.
Panel A shows that in the early period, graduates of less selective colleges earned a statistically
significant return on GPA of between 5 and 7 percent. Their counterparts at selective colleges earned
a much lower premium: at tier I colleges, the return is marginally significant at 3–4 percent; at
the more selective tier II and tier III colleges, the point estimates are essentially zero. However,
these gaps are small enough in magnitude (and the selective college GPA coefficients are too noisily
measured) that a null of no difference between the groups cannot be rejected.
Switching to panel B and the late period, the coefficient estimates for graduates of less
selective schools are about 0.13 for the whole sample and 0.14– 0.15 for full-time workers. At
tier I colleges, the GPA return, while statistically significant, is about half this size. For the full
sample, the gap in the GPA return widens from 0.018 in the early period to 0.059 in the late period,
roughly tripling, though the latter difference just fails statistical significance. For full-time workers,
however, the gap rises from 0.030 to 0.071 and is significant at the 10 percent level.
27The linearity of GPA results in all Wald statistics of selectivity differences across GPA having the same value.
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Table 3: Log Hourly Wages on GPA by Selectivity and Time Period
Panel A: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Sel. Dummy @ GPA=3.0 0.046*** 0.021 -0.026 0.046*** 0.021 0.044
[0.020 [0.025] [0.048] [0.016] [0.025] [0.047]
GPA, less-selective 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
GPA, selective 0.033 0.004 -0.030 0.038* 0.002 -0.001
[0.023] [0.036] [0.127] [0.020] [0.042] [0.147]
p-val for diff 0.489 0.236 0.542 0.195 0.155 0.676
Panel B: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Sel. Dummy @ GPA=3.0 0.094*** 0.129*** 0.173*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 0.142***
[0.021] [0.034] [0.048] [0.020] [0.029] [0.044]
GPA, less-selective 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.154*** 0.146*** 0.136***
[0.022] [0.019] [0.020] [0.023] [0.020] [0.019]
GPA, selective 0.076** -0.004 -0.015 0.083** 0.027 0.006
[0.036] [0.067] [0.075] [0.033] [0.044] [0.086]
p-val for diff 0.152 0.048 0.075 0.073 0.012 0.135
p-val for diff-in-diff 0.419 0.235 0.666 0.372 0.323 0.673
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.240 0.239 0.237 0.264 0.262 0.261
Controls for sex, race, and
college major?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights. The dependent variable in each
column is the real log hourly wage. Panel A shows results from the 1960s and 1970s and Panel B from
the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for
arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
At tier II and III schools, the growth in the gap is more pronounced, largely because the
return on GPA at these selective schools did not change at all. Among all workers, the tier II gap
grows from 0.046 to a statistically significant 0.136, and the tier III gap increases from 0.078 to
0.137. For full-time workers, these gaps jump from 0.062 to 0.119 and 0.062 to 0.130. Only the
last of these, owing to the small sample size of tier III grads, fails to be statistically significant.28
28The GPA estimates for less selective colleges are lower when the selectivity threshold is higher because the less
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Moreover, these results are robust to using the alternative quality index definition of selectivity, as
shown in Appendix Table 2, panels B and C.
When one attempts to measure whether the growth in the GPA return gaps is statistically
significant, this difference-in-difference, while of a nontrivial magnitude, comes up short. Despite
this growth averaging (across selectivity tiers) about 0.06 log points, greater than the GPA returns
at less selectives in the early period, the estimates at selective schools are too noisily measured for
a double difference to have sufficient precision for these data. While a null of no growth in the gap
cannot technically be rejected, the size of the point estimates is suggestive.
Returning to Figure 3 and the selectivity premium by GPA, we find that not only has the
selectivity premium risen throughout the GPA range between the 1960s–1970s and 1980s–2000s
periods, but, as a consequence of θ̂22 being larger than θ̂32, the premium’s decline with GPA has
become more pronounced. The selectivity premium at a GPA of 2.0 increased from 0.083 log points
in the early period to 0.207 log points in the late period, for a gain of 0.124. At a GPA of 3.0, closer
to the mean, the selectivity premium rose from a statistically insignificant 2 percent to 9 percent.
While this growth is considerable, it is much smaller than the gain at a 2.0 GPA, and growth in the
selectivity premium at higher levels of GPA is smaller still and generally not statistically significant.
Furthermore, while one can easily reject that the selectivity premium does not vary with GPA in
the later period, this hypothesis cannot be rejected in the early period, where both the level and
slope are smaller.
These results support Prediction 4, that the GPA return gap between more and less selective
schools has widened over time and, consequently, that the selectivity premium has become more
dependent on GPA. Moreover, the specific mechanisms underlying the prediction are supported.
The GPA return at less selective schools has unambiguously risen as ρ has increased. The GPA
return at more selective colleges has barely changed over time: not only is the effect of ρ on these
GPA returns weaker than at less selective colleges, but the shrinking ability variance would have
served to reduce the GPA return (equation 14). On net, then, it is perhaps not surprising that the
selective group includes the tier I colleges that are not tier II (columns 2 and 5) or the tier II colleges that are not tier
III (columns 3 and 6). If the tier III selective college estimate in panel B is compared with the less selective estimate
from column 4, the two are statistically different at 10 percent.
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GPA return has changed so little at selective colleges.
7 Conclusion
This paper formalizes and tests a model of ability signaling to explain the return to college quality
that has been documented in the literature. Notably, it is the first work to both theoretically
rationalize and empirically test a specific mechanism for this return. Based on data that span
five decades of students, the empirical results are consistent with the signaling model. Not only is
the return on GPA smaller at selective schools than at less prestigious institutions, the return on
selectivity itself declines as GPA, and average ability, rise.
Of course, that the patterns observed in the data are consistent with signaling cannot con-
clusively rule out alternative explanations, including variants of the human capital model. More
specifically, while I have assumed a production function where the signals of GPA and selectivity
provide information about the unknown ability parameter η, the production function could include
a value-added component, f(ηi, SELi, GPAi(e)), where f(·) represents the productive value added
by graduating from college, and may depend on the individual’s initial ability, the selectivity or
prestige of the college attended, and the effort exerted (as passed through the GPA function). While
existing data do not allow the examination of this productive value added, it is interesting that in
their survey of learning during college, Arum and Roksa (2011) do not find significant differences
in the correlations of GPA with learning (as measured by the Collegiate Learning Assessment) by
school selectivity. Their finding, along with the varying “return” to GPA by college selectivity
found in this paper, imply restrictions on any generalized value-added model that seeks to explain
the college selectivity premium.
None of this is meant to imply that institutions of higher education should be thought of
primarily as signaling devices for students. Indeed, nothing in the model or the empirical results
is inconsistent with college-going providing human capital to students. Rather, the intent of this
paper is to show that signaling provides a compelling alternative mechanism underlying the college
selectivity premium.
Moreover, the signaling model is appealing in that it can aid in understanding other stylized
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facts in the literature. For example, Bound, Hershbein, and Long (2009) document the increase
in competitive behavior among high school students trying to get admitted into selective colleges,
while Babcock and Marks (2011) show that study and class time among college students have
declined sharply over the past 40 years. The rising return to selectivity partially brought about by
increased ability sorting may help explain this apparent shift in effort from college (second stage)
to high school (first stage). Because the greater degree of sorting leads to less variance in ability at
selective schools and makes GPA a noisier signal there, students have less incentive to work as hard
as they did previously. As the top students increasingly attend the selective colleges, the average
aptitude at less selective colleges falls, and thus so does the average effort. We would therefore
expect study time to decline across the selectivity spectrum, as Babcock and Marks (2010) find.
Finally, the model also suggests why employers appear to learn about the productivity of college
graduate workers much faster than that of high school graduate workers (Arciadocono, Bayer, and
Hizmo 2010): the signals that college graduates can send to employers are more revelatory of ability
than those from high school graduates, so there is less to to be learned.29 Human capital models
that seek to explain the selective college premium should also reconcile these stylized facts in order
to be persuasive.
It is also worth emphasizing that the evidence in favor of signaling is not at odds with
the findings of (ability-adjusted) returns to college selectivity in midcareer. Although employer-
learning papers typically assume that the the role of the signal generally diminishes over time as
the underlying characteristic that firms care about is revealed through experience (Altonji and
Pierret 2001, Lange 2007, Arciadocono et al. 2010), this need not be true in the presence of job
frictions where the initial signal can affect the productivity profile. In fact, Heisz and Oreopoulos
(2006) find empirical support for this exact type of labor friction using data on Canadian college
graduates and the types of training they receive as a function of their initial job placements. In
turn, Bose and Lang (2011) provide a microtheoretical foundation for this friction as firms try to
match specific tasks to the workers they think are best able to handle them; as the initial task
assignments are based on what the firms observe ex ante about the workers, the signals play a
29I present evidence of this phenomenon in Appendix D.
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role in further training and the chance of promotion. In the presence of career ladders, first jobs
matter because they open doors; as a consequence, a medium-ability student who graduated from
a selective college can have better career opportunities than a high-ability student who graduated
from a less selective college.
More generally, the two-dimensional signaling framework presented here is relevant to settings
other than the new college graduate labor market. For example, it could also be applied to an
experienced labor market where a worker sends signals of her productivity both through the last
company she worked for (the “selectivity” indicator) and her list of accomplishments while she
worked there (the “GPA” measure). The general idea in this context is that a prospective employer
can better infer the worker’s innate productivity from where she has worked than it can from a
series of bullet points playing up her contributions. This context is also attractive because it ties
directly into the one described in this paper through a career ladder mechanism, magnifying the
incentives faced as far back as high school (if not farther) for the forward-looking student.
30
References
Aigner, Dennis J., and Glen G. Cain. 1977. “Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Mar-
kets.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30(2): 175–187.
Arcidiacono, Peter, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo. 2010. “Beyond Signaling and Human Capital:
Education and the Revelation of Ability.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(4):
76–104.
Arum, Richard, and Josipa Roksa. 2011. Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Cam-
puses. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Babcock, Philip and Mindy Marks. 2011. “The Falling Time Cost of College: Evidence from Half
a Century of Time Use Data.” Review of Economics and Statistics 93(2): 468–478.
Barron’s Profile of American Colleges, 14th ed. 1984. Woodbury, NY: Barron’s Educational Series.
Barron’s Profile of American Colleges, 19th ed. 1992. Woodbury, NY: Barron’s Educational Series.
Bedard, Kelly. 2001. “Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School
Dropouts.” Journal of Political Economy 109(4): 749–775.
Black, Dan A., and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2006. “Estimating the Returns to College Quality with
Multiple Proxies for Quality.” Journal of Labor Economics 24(3): 701–728.
Bose, Gautam, and Kevin Lang. 2011. “A Theory of Monitoring and Internal Labor Markets.”
Boston University Working Paper.
Bound, John, Charles Brown, and Nancy Mathiowetz. 2001. “Measurement Error in Survey Data.”
In Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5. James J. Heckman and Edward Leamer, eds. Amsterdam:
North Holland.
Bound, John, Brad Hershbein, and Bridget T. Long. 2009. “Playing the Admissions Game: Student
Reactions to Increasing College Competition.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 29(4): 119–146.
Breland, Hunter, James Maxey, Renee Gernand, Tammie Cumming, and Catharine Trapani. 2002.
Trends in College Admission 2000. Tallahassee, FL: Association for Institutional Research. http:
//www.airweb.org/images/trendsreport.pdf. Accessed on October 1, 2011.
Brewer, Dominic J., Eric R. Eide, and Ronald G. Ehrenberg. 1999. “Does it Pay to Attend an Elite
Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence on the Effects of College Type on Earnings.” Journal of
Human Resources 34(1): 104–123.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010. Number of Jobs, Labor Market Experience, and Earnings Growth:
Results From A Longitudinal Survey. Washington, DC: Department of Labor. http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/nlsoy.toc.htm. Accessed on August 10, 2011.
Courant, Paul N., Alexandra M. Resch, and James M. Sallee. 2008. “On the Optimal Allocation of
Students and Resources in a System of Higher Education.” B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &
Policy 8(1): (Advances).
31
Dale, Stacy B., and Alan B. Krueger. 2002. “Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective
College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117(4): 1491–1527.
Epple, Dennis, Richard Romano, and Holger Sieg. 2006. “Admission, Tuition, and Financial Aid
Policies in the Market for Higher Education.” Econometrica 74(4): 885–928.
Gill, Andrew M., and Duane E. Leigh. 2003. “Do the Returns to Community Colleges Differ Between
Academic and Vocational Programs?” Journal of Human Resources 38(1): 134–155.
Heckman, James, and Edward Vytlacil. 2001. “Identifying the Role of Cognitive Ability in Ex-
plaining the Level of and Change in the Return to Schooling.” Review of Economics and Statistics
83(1): 1–12.
Heckman, James, Jora Stixrud, and Sergio Urzua. 2006. “The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive
Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior.” Journal of Labor Economics 24(3):
411–482.
Heisz, Andrew, and Philip Oreopoulos. 2006. “The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and
Promotion.” Statistics Canada Analytical Studies - Research Paper Series 11F0019MIE 236.
Hoekstra, Mark. 2009. “The Effect of Attending the Flagship State University on Earnings: A
Discontinuity-Based Approach.” Review of Economics and Statistics 91(4): 717–724.
Hoxby, Caroline M. 2001. “The Return to Attending a More Selective College: 1960 to the Present.”
In Forum Futures: Exploring the Future of Higher Education, 2000 Papers. Maureen Devlin and
Joel Meyerson, eds. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 13–42.
Hoxby, Caroline M. 2009. “The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 29(4): 95–118.
Kahn, Lisa B. 2010. “The Long-Term Labor Market Consequences of Graduating from College in
a Bad Economy.” Labour Economics 17(2): 303–316.
Kuh, George, and Shouping Hu. 1999. “Unraveling the Complexity of the Increase in College Grades
from the Mid-1980s to the Mid-1990s.” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 21(3): 297–320.
Lang, Kevin, and Erez Siniver. 2011. “Why is an Elite Undergraduate Education Valuable? Evi-
dence from Israel.” Labour Economics 18(6): 767–777.
Lange, Fabian. 2007. “The Speed of Employer Learning.” Journal of Labor Economics 25(1): 1–35.
Lange, Fabian, and Robert Topel. 2006. “The Social Value of Education and Human Capital.”
Handbook of the Economics of Education, Vol. 1. Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch, eds. Amsterdam:
North Holland.
Malamud, Ofer, and Abigail Wozniak. 2008. “The Impact of College Graduation on Geographic
Mobility: Identifying Education Using Multiple Components of Vietnam Draft Risk.” IZA Working
Paper Series No. 3432.
32
McKinney, Arlise P., and Angela Miles. 2009. “Gender Differences In U.S. Performance Measures
for Personnel Selection.” Equal Opportunities International 28(2): 121–134.
Moore, Jonathan C., Linda L. Stinson, and Edward J. Welniak, Jr. 2000. “Income Measurement
Error in Surveys: A Review.” Journal of Official Statistics 66(4): 331–361.
Murnane, Robert, John Willett, and Frank Levy. 1995. “The Growing Importance of Cognitive
Skills in Wage Determination.” Review of Economics and Statistics 77(2): 251–266.
National Center for Education Statistics. 1988. 1987-88 Directory of Postsecondary Institutions:
Volume 1, 4 year and 2 year. Washington, DC: Department of Education.
Oreopoulos, Philip, Till von Wachter, and Andrew Heisz. 2012. “The Short- and Long-Term Career
Effects of Graduating in a Recession.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4(1): 1–29.
Pascarella, Ernest T., and Patrick T. Terenzini. 2005. How College Affects Students: A Third
Decade of Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Psacharopoulos, George. 1974. “College Quality as a Screening Device.” Journal of Human Re-
sources 9(4): 556–558.
Rothschild, Michael, and Lawrence J. White. 1995. “The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Educa-
tion and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs.” Journal of Political Economy 10(3):
573–586.
Spence, Michael. 1973 “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3): 355–374.
Snyder, Thomas D., and Sally A. Dillow. 2011. Digest of Education Statistics, 2010. Washington,
D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.
Toor, Rachel. 2001. Admissions Confidential: An Insider’s Account of the Elite College Selection
Process. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Wales, Terence. 1973. “The Effect of College Quality on Earnings: Results from the NBER-





Claim: Below η̃, students exert no effort in first stage.






= f ′(ẽ1) (w(E[GPAj=1,η̃], SELj=1)− w(E[GPAj=0,η̃], SELj=0)) . 
Claim: Above η̃, e∗1 is rising in η if marginal cost falls in ability faster than does expected marginal
benefit.














Rearranging and evaluating ∂w(·)∂η :[
−α2 − α3e∗1
(η + α1)2





















+ f ′′(e∗1) · w(·)
.
The denominator is strictly negative. The numerator will be negative (and the quotient positive)






. Note that the second term is strictly positive and
−f ′(e∗1) is negative. If k1 ≥ k0, the quotient will always be positive. If k1 < k0, the condition binds,
with the left-hand side of the inequality representing the slope of expected marginal benefit and
the right-hand side the slope of marginal cost. 
Claim: η̃ is rising in ẽ.
Proof: This follows from the previous claim by replacing e∗1 with ẽ and η with η̃. However, as
w(·) is a function of η and not η̃, ∂w(·)∂η̃ = 0. The quotient is thus unambiguously positive. 
Section 4
Proposition 1: E[η | j = 1]− E[η | j = 0] > 0.
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Proof: A firm’s expectation of the ability of a student who graduated from a selective college is:












































where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions, respec-
tively. Similarly, the firm’s expectation of ability if the student had graduated from a less selective
college is:




















































































1(η))φ(η)dη > 0, since
f(·) is increasing in its argument. Thus every term in both numerators is positive, except for
−εφ(η̃); however, it was assumed that ε is close to zero. It therefore follows that E[η1]−E[η0] > 0.

Proposition 2: ∂(E[η | j=1]−E[η | j=0])∂η̃ > 0.
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The first term is unambiguously positive. Suppose η̃ < 0. Then the second term is unambiguously
negative, and the whole expression is positive. If η̃ = 0, then the second term equals zero, and the















. V (ηj=1) is actually k · V (ηf(η)|η > η̃), where k is a positive constant
that adjusts for the renormalization of the distribution of ηf(η) on the interval from η̃ to infinity.
Since k is a constant and f(η) is a positive-valued increasing function, the derivative of V (η|η > η̃)
will have the same sign as the derivative of k · V (ηf(η)|η > η̃). It thus suffices to show that the
derivative of the first variance is negative. But this is true trivially. As η̃ → −∞, the variance
approaches that of a standard normal, 1; as η̃ → ∞, the variance collapses to 0. Symmetry and
single-peakedness of the normal distribution imply that the variance must fall monotonically. 
Proposition 4: V (ηj=1) < V (ηj=0) if η̃ > 0.
Proof: First note that, because f(·) is increasing and maps between 0 and 1, it follows that
V (ηj=1) = V [ηf(e
∗










. Next, because some
individuals with η > η̃ do not get admitted to the selective college and instead attend the less
















































When η̃ = 0, symmetry implies that the first term in brackets is equal to the second terms in
brackets, and thus the whole expression is equal to 0.
Note, using L’Hôpital’s rule, that the first term in brackets approaches 0 as η̃ → −∞ and
is monotonically increasing; likewise, the second term in brackets approaches 0 as η̃ → ∞ and is
monotonically decreasing. 
Appendix B: Relaxing functional form on the GPA-effort function
In Section 3, the relationship between effort and GPA, given by equation (5), assumed the same
linear function for all college tiers. If the relationship does vary across selectivity type, it is not
clear how, à priori. For example, it could be argued that classes are more difficult at more selective
schools, which could imply a lower γ1 at these schools if more effort is required to obtain the same
expected grade. On the other hand, it has also been argued that grade inflation is more prevalent
at selective schools (Kuh and Hu 1999), which could suggest a higher γ1 and lower γ2.
Here I allow the linear relationship to vary by college tier and sketch how the solution char-
acteristics change from the canonical setup. Suppose that the GPA function is now
GPAj(e2) = γ1j + γ2je2 + ν,
where the j subscript indicates that the coefficients are specific to college type. Because there exists
a well-defined maximum GPA in the data (4.0), the functions should converge as effort increases,
leaving two cases of interest.
Case 1: γ11 > γ10 ; γ21 < γ20, or there is a higher intercept but smaller slope at the more selective
tier. This case could correspond with greater grade inflation/compression at selective schools, as
the return on effort to GPA is diminished. As indicated by equation (8), the lower slope implies a
contraction of effort across the ability distribution at selective schools. On the other hand, ∂w∂GPA
may rise, since for a fixed change in expected GPA, there is now a larger variation in ability.30 Thus
the difference in effort distribution from the original setup is uncertain, but higher-ability students
still exert more effort at each school type. Functionally, this should lead to a smaller difference in
the returns to GPA at the different tiers relative to the homogeneous case.
30In the absence of the error term ν, grade inflation/compression can make grades more important to employers, since
average ability levels vary more across grades. This effect will be mitigated, however, the larger is the variance of ν.
37
Case 2: γ11 < γ10 ; γ21 > γ20, or there is a lower intercept but steeper slope at the more selective
tier. This case could correspond with harder classes (or smarter peers) at selective schools, with
more effort required to achieve the same expected grade as at less selective schools. As indicated by
equation (8), the steeper slope implies an increase of effort across the ability distribution at selective
schools. On the other hand, ∂w∂GPA may fall, since for a fixed change in expected GPA, there is now
a smaller variation in ability. Thus the difference in effort distribution from the original setup is
again uncertain, but higher-ability students still exert more effort at each school type. Functionally,
this should lead to a larger difference in the returns to GPA at the different tiers relative to the
homogeneous case.
Appendix C: Empirical Support for Model Assumptions
C.1: Linearity of GPA in effort and ability
The model in Section 3 makes a strong functional form assumption that expected GPA is linear in
effort (equation (5)). With the additional assumption of normally distributed ability, optimization
implies that (1) average GPA is a linear function of ability and (2) average wages are a linear
function of GPA. (Both of these slopes can, and generally will, vary across selectivity tiers.) This
appendix section provides empirical support for these assumptions using both graphs and statistical
tests.
To demonstrate the validity of (1), Appendix Figures 5 and 6 present nonparametric estimates
of GPA on the normalized senior test score for less selective colleges and for selectivity tier II.31 Each
figure has six panels: one that pools all cohorts, and one for each cohort separately. The relationship
in the first panel of Appendix Figure 5, which pools all the data from less selective colleges, shows
a distinct linear pattern between ability and GPA. The only appearance of strong curvature occurs
at the endpoints of the ability distribution, where there are few observations and large standard
errors, as shown by the shaded 95 percent confidence bands. The other panels of the figure show this
pattern holds across each data set individually except for Project Talent in the 1960s, which shows
a slight convex shape. Notably, this is the sole data set for which only categorical self-reported
GPA is available, and aggregation effects may overly influence the nonparametric estimates. For
selectivity tier II in Appendix Figure 6, the relationships are noisy, but it is easy to see that a
straight line lies within each panel’s confidence band. Furthermore, higher-order global polynomial
specifications (beyond linear) are rejected empirically. Taken together, there seems little evidence
from these graphs to call into question the assumption of linearity of GPA in ability.
While it follows from this assumption that average wages should be linear in GPA, I test
this, too. I modify equations (16) and (17) to allow for selectivity-specific quadratics or cubics in
31The specific procedure is a local linear regression using an Epanechnikov kernel with the bandwidth that minimizes
integrated squared error. Nonparametric estimate for the other selectivity tiers are not shown for brevity but are
available on request.
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GPA. Wald tests are then performed on the higher-order polynomial terms against a null of zero;
a rejection would suggest that wages are not, in fact, linear in GPA. Appendix Table 3 shows the
F-statistics and p-values from these Wald tests. Panel A presents pooled data, while panels B and
C perform tests separately for the “early” and “late” periods.
Panel A shows that while nonlinearity does not seem to present among the sample of all
workers (columns 1 through 3), there is some evidence in favor of a quadratic specification among
full-time workers who graduated from less selective colleges. Specifically, the Wald tests in columns
4 and 5 can reject the null at 10 percent, though not at 5 percent. The quadratic pattern suggested
by the data is convex, such that the return on GPA is rising in GPA. Tracing out the estimates,
the return on GPA at less selective colleges exceeds the return at more selective colleges once GPA
reaches 2.6, about half a standard deviation below the mean. Thus, even allowing this nonlinearity
would not alter the conclusion that GPA returns are larger at less selective colleges.
Panels B and C show that the nonlinear GPA returns are driven entirely by the early period
and actually prefer a cubic specification. (Interestingly, it is in Project Talent in the early period
where evidence of a nonlinear GPA-ability relationship was found.) Tracing out the estimates in
this case reveals that GPA returns are higher at less selective colleges except at the highest portion
of the GPA distribution (GPA ≥ 3.5), which is relatively sparse in the early period. Therefore, this
does not seem a major threat to the model assumptions, either. In sum, the linearity assumptions
are empirically plausible.
C.2: Empirical densities of GPA and ability
Appendix Figures 1 and 2 show kernel density estimates of GPA across selectivity tiers for each of
the five data sets used in the paper.32 At less selective institutions, in each time period, the esti-
mated densities appear approximately normal upon visual inspection, with a single peak, minimal
skewness, and only slight truncation at the upper bound of 4. While the densities at the selective
tiers are not quite as well behaved, this is somewhat expected due to their much smaller sample
sizes. Still, even these densities tend to be unimodal and reasonably symmetric, the more so the
larger the number of observations used to construct them.
Appendix Figures 3 and 4 show similar kernel density estimates of the senior test score
measure of student ability. (I have rescaled this ability measure to have a mean of 0 and variance
of 1 among the full estimation sample to better reflect the model.) As expected, dispersion in
ability falls sharply as selectivity rises, and this is even more prevalent in the more recent periods,
except for the NLSY97, which uses a different testing scheme (see data appendix). These densities,
moreover, also exhibit an approximately normal distribution, even more so than the GPA densities
in most cases. They are all single-peaked, show little excess kurtosis, and exhibit relatively little
skewness. (The NELS densities do have slightly more pronounced left skewness, but this is at
32Bandwidth is chosen according to the Sheather-Jones plug-in method with the Epanechnikov kernel.
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least partially an artifact of the testing instrument, which exhibited a greater degree of upper-level
censoring than in earlier periods.33)
Nonetheless, I simulated data to resemble these empirical distributions in order to examine
whether the implications of bivariate normality shown in equation (11) are robust to departures
from exact normality. The resulting biases in the slope and intercept terms were minimal, on the
order of 2 percent, and the true parameters could not be statistically rejected. While it would be
a stretch to expect the densities of GPA and ability to be precisely normal in the data, treating
them as approximately normal does not seem unreasonable.
C.3: Bounding the variance of ν
A minimum bound of the variance of ν can be estimated by using equation (9) with limits on






is effectively bounded between 0 and 3. With η ∼ N(0, 1), fewer than 1 out of 10,000
observations will take on an (absolute) value greater than 4, so with δ1 = 4, the expression ηi + δ1
is approximately bounded between 0 and 8. This implies that
γ22kj
δ2
has an effective upper bound of


















= 0.1406. Thus, even assuming that the variance in ability
conditional on selectivity (σ2ηj ) is as large as the unconditional variance (σ
2
η) of 1, the deterministic
component of GPA can account for at most 0.1406∗10.235 , or about three-fifths, of the overall variance,
leaving at least two-fifths due to the noise term, ν. In practice, however, the fraction of variance
in GPA due to the stochastic component is probably higher. For example, the observed empirical
support of GPA seems to have a lower bound closer to 1.5 than 1.0, and there appears to be




has an upper bound less than 0.375 and perhaps closer to 0.25. The fraction of variance
due to ν would then be on the order of 70 percent. Additionally, if σ2ηj < 1, the relevance of ν rises
further. The importance of the random component in explaining the variance of GPA is therefore
likely substantial.
C.4: A comment on risk-averse agents
The model assumes that students are risk neutral, but if they are uniformly risk averse, qualitatively
nothing changes except effort distributions (by ability) will be compressed. Intuitively, this occurs
33This censoring does not result from the sample restriction used in this paper but is rather symptomatic of all
respondents with this metric in the NELS.
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because higher wages—and thus effort—exhibit diminishing marginal returns to utility. If risk
aversion is positively correlated with ability, outcomes become ambiguous: college sorting by ability
is mitigated by risk aversion in the first stage, and the GPA-ability correlation is mitigated in the
second stage at less selective colleges. (Greater mixing by ability at selective colleges due to varying
risk aversion makes the GPA return there ambiguous). This would generally bias against finding a
selectivity premium or differences in GPA return by selectivity. On the other hand, if risk aversion
is negatively correlated with ability, then outcomes are qualitatively as in the risk neutral case:
sorting by ability is strengthened in the first stage, and effort distribution widens in the second
stage but is ability-rank preserving.
C.5: A comment on worker sorting across firms
The model assumes that all firms are homogeneous and distinguish workers by paying them different
amounts based on their signals of productivity. More realistically, firms are heterogeneous and are
willing to hire only workers whose expected productivity is within some band, with variations in
pay of new workers quite small within a given firm (controlling for job type). Put differently, a
higher value of a signal does not raise a worker’s pay at some fixed firm; rather, it qualifies the
worker to get hired at a different company that hires higher-ability workers at a higher wage. While
this distinction is worth mentioning, as the treatment is imprecise in this regard, it is not important
for empirical analysis. As long as workers can costlessly sort across firms, then the implications
continue to hold, and firm heterogeneity of this sort is unimportant.
C.6: A comment on GPA differences between men and women
Finally, it is well documented that there are substantial differences in GPA between men and women
(Pascarella and Terenzini 2005), and this is empirically true in each of the data sets used in this
study, with women averaging a 0.1 to 0.2 point advantage over men. Moreover, this advantage
is roughly constant throughout the distribution except in the extreme tails. In the context of the
model, this would be consistent with women and men having different intercepts but the same slope
in equation 5, which would not affect their optimization. Employers presumably build this into
their expectations of productivity, and this can be controlled empirically by using dummies for sex
in the regressions. Of course, this assumes the same ability distribution for men and women, and
this seems reasonable using senior year ability scores (although not SAT/ACTs, which are known
to exhibit differences by sex).
Appendix D: Signaling and Employer Learning
The signaling model in this paper can also help explain why employers appear to learn about the
productivity of college graduate workers much faster than that of high school graduate workers.
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Arcidiacono et al. (2008), for example, show that while ability (AFQT) is only weakly correlated
with log wages among recent high school graduates, with this correlation growing with worker expe-
rience, the ability-wage correlation among college graduates shows up immediately, with negligible
growth over the career. In the context of ability signaling, this is precisely the result one would
expect to find if the signals that college graduates can send are more revelatory of ability than
those from high school graduates. Curiously, the authors’ attempt to demonstrate this supposition
is relegated to a brief section in an appendix, where they regress AFQT on college entrance scores
and college major and find a high R2 (0.57 to 0.73). However, these regressions do not actually
show that college graduates can better signal their ability to employers: as mentioned earlier, it
is not at all clear that college entrance scores are visible to potential employers, and there is no
attempt to compare signals with those of high school graduates.
I undertake such an exercise here. Specifically, using a regression similar to (16), I calculate
how well the signals of college selectivity and GPA (along with college major, race and sex) can
predict the standardized measure of aptitude in the pooled data. For comparison, I construct a
sample of (exact) high school graduates who take wage jobs within a year of high school graduation
and aren’t self-employed or in the military. While college selectivity does not have a direct analogue
at the high school level, high school GPA replaces college GPA as the relevant signal in this
sample. Because other characteristics of the high school record may serve as signals, I include some
specifications that also include quartile indicators for each of sports, leadership, and prior work
experience, and the number of semesters (and their square) taken in each academic, business, and
vocational subject.34
As the interest is in the variance of the prediction error, the relevant statistic is 1n
∑
σ̂2, the
mean squared error (or average variance of the residuals), and not R2, which normalizes by the
variance in ability. Appendix Table D.1 shows the calculated mean squared error of the prediction,
as well as the total variance of ability, for both the high school graduate and college graduate
samples.35 The MSE is substantially lower (about 30 percent less) among the college sample
(column 1) than among the high school sample (column 2), and this difference is similar in size
in both the early and late periods (panels B and C). Even with the additional potential high
school signals (column 3), the MSE is larger for the high school graduates than for the college
graduates. Furthermore, these additional signals seem to have less marginal predictive power in
the late period relative to the early period, particularly among full-time workers (columns 5 and 6).
These relative prediction errors help illustrate why employer learning is more rapid among college
graduate workers than high school graduate workers: the initial signals available can more precisely
pinpoint the worker’s ability, so there is less to be revealed through experience.
34See the data appendix for details on the construction of these measures.
35In the college regressions, the partial correlation of GPA on ability is always lower, and often statistically significantly
so, at selective colleges than at less selective colleges, consistent with equation (11).
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Appendix Table D.1: Prediction Errors on Ability for College and High School
Panel A: Pooled, All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Coll HS HS Coll HS HS
MSE 0.433 0.625 0.525 0.434 0.630 0.528
mean(ability) 0.721 -0.397 -0.397 0.724 -0.429 -0.429
var(ability) 0.579 0.821 0.821 0.574 0.789 0.789
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Coll HS HS Coll HS HS
MSE 0.431 0.624 0.505 0.435 0.608 0.496
mean(ability) 0.703 -0.465 -0.465 0.706 -0.461 -0.461
var(ability) 0.561 0.754 0.754 0.557 0.726 0.726
Panel C: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Coll HS HS Coll HS HS
MSE 0.431 0.617 0.524 0.433 0.638 0.534
mean(ability) 0.743 -0.332 -0.332 0.747 -0.390 -0.390
var(ability) 0.600 0.877 0.877 0.594 0.865 0.865
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are mean squared errors (MSE) and mean absolute errors (MAE)  from OLS regressions of ability on 
signals using sampling weights. All samples are restricted to those who are working with wages. All regressions include 
controls for sex and race. Selectivity signals for college group also include college major, college GPA, selectivity dummy, and 
interactions of the selectivity dummy with college GPA. The selectivity thresholds are based on Tier II thresholds; using Tier I or 
Tier III thresholds produces similar results. High school signals include high school GPA and other controls as shown. Panel A 
shows results for all cohorts together; Panel B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
Yes
Controls for course-taking, 
sports, leadership, and 
work
 — No Yes  — No
Table 4: Prediction Errors on Ability for College and High School
(Depen ent variable is normalized ability measure)
Controls for course-taking, 
sports, leadership, and 
work
— No Yes — No Yes
Note: Estimates shown are mean squared errors (MSE) from OLS regressions of normalized ability on signals
using sampling weights. All samples are restricted to those who are working with wages. All regressions
include controls for sex and race. Selectivity signals for college group also include college major, college GPA,
selectivity dummy, and interactions of the selectivity dummy with college GPA. The selectivity thresholds
are based on Tier II thresholds; using Tier I or Tier III thresholds produces similar results. High school
signals include high school GPA and other controls as shown. Panel A shows results for all cohorts together;
Panel B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
Data Appendix
The National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) has conducted four nationally representative,
large-scale, longitudinal surveys of secondary students since 1972. Each of these surveys origi-
nally sampled between 12,000 and 25,000 students in a given grade cohort, with follow-up survey
waves over the next several years. Designed to shed light on the secondary school to postsecondary
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school and school-to-work transitions, the surveys ask questions about demographic background,
school experiences, education and work expectations, and labor market outcomes. Additionally,
each survey cohort was administered a cognitive test battery. In most cases, the data variables are
directly comparable across the four different surveys. Central to the analysis presented here, the
restricted-access versions of these data sets allow the identification of all postsecondary institutions
attended and have complete postsecondary transcript data for most students who reported attend-
ing a postsecondary institution. Because the most recent of these four surveys is too new to have
data on respondents’ transitions after college graduation, I use the first three surveys, described
below.
I supplement the NCES data with two additional, nationally-representative data sets that
allow analysis of the new college graduate labor market in the 1960s—Project Talent—and the
2000s—the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997. These surveys cover much of the same
sets of questions as do the NCES surveys, including specific colleges attended and cognitive test
batteries. While self-reported cumulative GPA is available in these latter data sets, transcript data,
unfortunately, are not.
NLS72
The National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 queried approximately 17,000
high school seniors in the spring of 1972, with follow-up waves in 1973, 1974, 1976, 1979, and
1986.36 I focus on respondents from the 1976 and 1979 waves, by which time most respondents
have completed their undergraduate postsecondary education.
HSB
The High School and Beyond survey consists of two cohorts: sophomores in 1980 and seniors in
1980 (approximately 14,000 students of each). Each cohort had follow-ups in 1982, 1984, and 1986;
the sophomore cohort alone had an additional follow-up in 1992. Because the 1992 follow-up is
several years after the sophomore cohort was on track to graduate from college (1986), I use the
senior cohort and focus on the 1986 wave.
NELS
The National Educational Longitudinal Survey began following nearly 25,000 8th graders in 1988,
with follow-ups in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000. As these students were on track to graduate high
school in 1992 and college in 1996 (under normal progression), I focus on respondents in the 2000
wave.
Project Talent
36As in all of the NCES surveys here, new individuals were often added in some of the later waves.
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Project Talent surveyed approximately 100,000 each of 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th graders in 1960,
with follow-ups 1, 5, and 11 years after anticipated high school graduation.37 I use the recently
available ICPSR 1-in-4 sample of the senior cohort, as the other cohorts do not have the required
job timing information necessary for analysis, and focus on the 5-year follow-up.
NLSY97
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 surveyed 8,984 12 to 17 year-olds beginning in
1997, with annual follow-ups. By 2009, the last data year available, respondents are aged 25 through
29. I use the geocoded version, available with application from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
information from all available waves.
Sample Restrictions and Variable Construction
Because the five data sets differ in the timing of their follow-up interviews, care was taken to make
them as consistent as possible. In each survey, the estimation sample was restricted to individuals
who had earned their bachelors degree at U.S. institutions within 6 years of high school graduation,
and at the time of observation had earned no additional (graduate) degree, were not currently
enrolled in school, were working for pay with real (year 2005) hourly earnings between 5 and 100
dollars, and were neither self-employed nor in the military. After imposing these conditions, the
final sample size consists of 2,803 individuals for NLS72; 1,078 individuals for HSB; 1,902 individuals
for NELS; 2,025 in Project Talent; and 829 in NLSY97. Appendix Table 1 contains more detailed
information on how the restrictions affect the sample size for each data set.
College Information
College major, GPA, date of graduation, and college itself are taken from the institution from which
the respondent graduated. When available, these measures come directly from the post-secondary
transcript (90.5 percent of cases in the NLS72, 55.0 percent of cases in the HSB, and 94.9 percent in
the NELS); otherwise, they are taken from self-reported information in the survey.38 For students
who attended more than one post-secondary institution before earning a bachelor’s degree, GPA is
based on courses taken at the degree-granting school.
While detailed college major is provided in the data, I collapse these into 11 categories that are
consistent across data sets: humanities, social sciences, psychology, life sciences, physical sciences
and mathematics, engineering, education, business, arts, health, and other.
37Based on normal progression. Respondents were followed regardless of actual high school graduation.
38The much lower transcript data rate in the HSB is due to post-secondary transcripts being collected earlier in that
survey (in 1984, four years after high school) relative to the others. Consequently, students who earned their degrees
more than four years after high school graduation do not have complete transcript data.
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When transcript data are available, GPA is calculated as the credit-weighted average of all
course grades (on the standard 4-point scale) earned at the institution of graduation up to the
date of degree receipt. Courses that do not receive grades (e.g., pass/fail, audits, drops, and
withdrawals) are ignored in the GPA calculation. When transcript data are unavailable, self-
reported GPA is used. (For observations with both measures available, the correlation between
the two is 0.84 for NLS72, 0.87 for HSB, and 0.75 for NELS.). In the NLS72 and HSB, GPA
is self-reported categorically (A, A-/B+, B, B-/C+, etc.) for all postsecondary courses to date
(not just at the degree-granting institution). Project Talent also uses a categorical scale, although
it is finer than NLS72 and HSB (A, A-, B+, B, etc.). These categories are converted to a 4-
point numeric scale. NELS and NLSY97 ask respondents to report cumulative GPA as a numeric
variable; NELS converts these self-reports to a 4-point scale internally, while NLSY97 provides the
institution-specific grading scale; in this latter case, I performed the 4-point conversion manually.
College selectivity indicators are matched to the degree-granting college of each sample re-
spondent using either the FICE code (NLS72, HSB, and Project Talent) or UNITID code (NELS
and NLSY97) of the institution.
Alternative Selectivity Measures
While the Barron’s rankings constitute the preferred selectivity metric due to their construction
from attributes based entirely on students, as another measure of college selectivity I adopt the
strategy of a quality index advocated by Black and Smith (2006). The quality index is created by
applying factor analysis on five characteristics of each college: the faculty-student ratio, the rejection
rate of applicants, the freshman retention rate, mean SAT/ACT score of entering freshmen, and
mean faculty salaries. The factor analysis produces weights, or factor loadings, for each of these
characteristics under the assumption they are each composites of some latent underlying “factors.”
Calling the first and most important of these factors “quality,” the factor loadings allow construction
of a quality index, a linear combination of the characteristics that accounts for their correlation.
Using data on colleges from 1991 provided by Smith, I create the quality index for each college
that has sufficient data and then compute percentiles.39 Again, three different binary indicators
for selectivity are calculated. The first of these is coded 1 if the quality index percentile is at or
above 80, and 0 otherwise (QI I); the second is coded 1 if the percentile is at or above 90, and
0 otherwise (QI II), and the third is coded 1 if the percentile is at or above 95, and 0 otherwise
(QI III).40 Of the 10 highest ranked colleges by the quality index, all 10 are considered to be in
39Data for each characteristic from before 1991 are not readily available for many colleges, which prevents it from being
the preferred quality measure. However, as student characteristics evolve slowly (Black and Smith 2006), using 1991
data should still be a reasonable proxy for earlier cohorts.
40As in the Barron’s rankings, colleges without sufficient data to calculate a quality index are usually less selective
ones. A virtue of using a binary measure for selectivity rather than a continuous one is that more colleges (and thus
respondents) can be analyzed, and estimates can be compared across different selectivity measures without worrying
about sample composition effects arising from the inability to cardinally rank every school.
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Barron’s highest category in 1992, nine are in the highest category in 1982, and eight are in the
highest category in 1972. (The top 10 not in Barron’s highest category 1982 or 1972 are ranked
in the second-highest category.) More generally, the quality index approach is less discriminating
between selectivity levels than is the Barron’s system, but the effect is minor. Complete summary
statistics using the quality index are available on request.
Ability Measures
For each data set, I construct two measures of cognitive ability: SAT/ACT percentile and (high
school) senior year test score. The SAT/ACT percentile is calculated from the SAT or ACT
score of the respondent as follows. For students with SAT scores, their verbal and math scores
were adjusted to the recentered scale using the College Board’s concordance table41, summed, and
then converted to a percentile score using the 2005–2006 year distribution, also from the College
Board.42 For students with ACT scores (and without SAT scores), composite scores were converted
to SAT equivalent scores using concordance table jointly developed by the College Board and the
ACT43 and then converted into percentiles as above. (Similar results are produced if ACT scores
are converted directly into percentiles using the ACT score distribution.) SAT and ACT scores
have relatively high item nonresponse, in part because not all valid sample respondents took either
exam, and they are unavailable for the HSB sample, as they were not collected for the senior cohort.
However, because the scores are mapped to a fixed distribution, this measure is comparable across
time.
For each of the NCES data sets and Project Talent, the senior year test score is based on an
aptitude test battery administered to students during their senior year of high school (and thus is
available only for students who were surveyed during that wave.) The test batteries are similar but
not identical across survey waves and are intended to measure reading comprehension, vocabulary,
and mathematical knowledge. Scores are normalized to have a (population) mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1 among high school seniors within each cohort.
For NLSY97, I use the internally constructed ASVAB percentile score. About 80 percent of
respondents completed the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a 12-component test, in
1997. Based on four of these components—word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathemat-
ical knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning—NLSY staff computed percentile scores within three-
month age groups. While not representative of high school seniors, these scores represent age-
adjusted norms within cohorts.
While the senior year test and ASVAB scores are not strictly comparable across time, unlike






student outcomes. As such, the results reasonably capture both cognitive and noncognitive aptitude
(motivation, perseverance, etc.), which is more directly in line with the theoretical ability measure.
Job Information
Job information was taken from the first job that began after the respondent graduated with a
bachelor’s degree except in NELS, where it was taken from the current job held at the year 2000
interview (the only postgraduation job information available.)
In NLS72, earnings data are provided at the weekly level, and hourly earnings are constructed
by dividing weekly earnings at the first postgraduation job by the number of hours worked in an
average week at that job. In HSB, there are data for the number of hours usually worked per
week, the frequency at which one gets paid, and the rate of pay at this frequency. A majority of
sample individuals report being paid annually (about 55 percent), but hourly, weekly, biweekly,
and monthly are also options. In order to construct a comparable rate of pay variable, I transform
the earnings variables into an hourly figure. The transformation is the identity function for hourly
workers and is the rate of pay divided by the product of usual hours worked per week and the
number of weeks in the frequency unit (with 4.3 weeks per month and 52 weeks per year). In
NELS and Project Talent, the hourly rate of pay is constructed in a similar fashion as in HSB. For
NLSY97, there is an internally constructed hourly wage variable already available. Hourly earnings
in each data set are deflated to year 2005 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures
Deflator, and then logged.
High School Characteristics
High school GPA is taken from categorical student responses for each data set except for NELS,
where it is constructed (within the data set) using high school transcript data. High school GPA is
converted to a 4-point scale in a manner analogous to undergraduate GPA. Each data set has stu-
dents report the number of semesters (or Carnegie units) of each academic subject taken (English,
math, science, social science, and foreign language) during high school, and these are standardized
to be in semester units. I also constructed (separately by data set) indices for participation in high
school sports, leadership activities, and work experience based on student responses to a similar set
of questions available in each data set except for NLSY97. From these indices, I generate dummies
for being in each quartile, or separate dummies if the quartile measures cannot be made.
Job information for high school graduates was constructed from the same set of questions used











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 2: Log Hourly Wages on GPA by Selectivity (Quality Index 1991)
Panel A: Pooled, All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier QI QII QIII QI QII QIII
GPA, less-selective 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.100***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012]
GPA, selective 0.095*** 0.068 0.052 0.087*** 0.053 0.106**
[0.024] [0.043] [0.084] [0.021] [0.033] [0.048]
p-val for diff 0.708 0.632 0.673 0.400 0.120 0.904
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.241 0.235 0.237 0.264 0.260 0.260
Panel B: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier QI QII QIII QI QII QIII
GPA, less-selective 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014]
GPA, selective 0.019 0.004 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.044
[0.023] [0.027] [0.038] [0.018] [0.031] [0.040]
p-val for diff 0.137 0.108 0.519 0.008 0.164 0.671
Panel C: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selectivity Tier QI QII QIII QI QII QIII
GPA, less-selective 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.121*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.131***
[0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019]
GPA, selective 0.094** -0.002 -0.031 0.103*** 0.015 0.081
[0.039] [0.066] [0.151] [0.034] [0.045] [0.070]
p-val for diff 0.447 0.049 0.317 0.289 0.008 0.478
p-val for diff-in-diff 0.944 0.238 0.409 0.748 0.127 0.650
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8637 8637 8637 7580 7580 7580
Adjusted R-squared 0.245 0.240 0.241 0.268 0.264 0.263
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions using sampling weights. Panel A shows results for all cohorts together; Panel 
B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
(* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
Appendix Table 2: Log hourly wages on GPA by selectivity (Quality Index  1991)
(Dependent variable is real log hourly wage)
Controls for sex, race, and 
college major?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YesControls for sex, race, and 
college major?
Yes Yes
Note: Estimates shown are for OLS regressions on the real log hourly wage using sampling weights. College
sel ctivity i based on the Qual y Index from Black and S ith (2006). Panel A shows resul s for all ohorts
together; Panel B from the 1960s and 1970s; and Panel C from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Standard errors
(in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within
college. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Appendix Table 3: Wald Tests of Nonlinearity of Wages in GPA
Panel A: Pooled, All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Less-selective, quadratic 0.86 1.14 1.06 3.07 3.03 2.11
[0.354] [0.284] [0.303] [0.080] [0.082] [0.147]
Selective, quadratic 0.36 0.15 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.71
[0.549] [0.696] [0.610] [0.763] [0.992] [0.398]
Less-selective, cubic 0.46 0.96 0.66 1.51 1.90 1.13
[0.634] [0.385] [0.520] [0.221] [0.149] [0.324]
Selective, cubic 0.61 0.33 0.73 0.91 0.13 0.92
[0.545] [0.721] [0.483] [0.401] [0.879] [0.398]
Full-time only? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Pooled, early (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Less-selective, quadratic 0.43 0.12 0.33 0.79 0.55 0.93
[0.511] [0.725] [0.567] [0.376] [0.457] [0.335]
Selective, quadratic 0.17 0.86 0.39 0.03 1.12 0.03
[0.680] [0.354] [0.534] [0.875] [0.290] [0.873]
Less-selective, cubic 3.18 1.35 1.58 4.42 3.31 3.39
[0.042] [0.260] [0.206] [0.012] [0.037] [0.034]
Selective, cubic 0.23 0.44 0.29 0.17 0.62 0.87
[0.791] [0.644] [0.751] [0.846] [0.538] [0.421]
Panel C: Pooled, late (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Group Tier I Tier II Tier III Tier I Tier II Tier III
Less-selective, quadratic 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.30 0.02
[0.826] [0.980] [0.947] [0.529] [0.582] [0.878]
Selective, quadratic 0.50 0.21 1.12 0.00 0.03 1.14
[0.479] [0.650] [0.290] [0.955] [0.860] [0.285]
Less-selective, cubic 0.21 0.09 0.01 1.03 0.16 0.10
[0.808] [0.915] [0.985] [0.357] [0.853] [0.906]
Selective, cubic 0.92 0.39 0.80 0.92 0.06 0.83
[0.400] [0.680] [0.450] [0.397] [0.944] [0.438]
Notes: Estimates shown are F statistics (and p-values in brackets) from Wald tests for whether the coefficients on higher-order 
polynomial terms in GPA are equal to a null of zero. See Table 3 for other notes.
Appendix Table 3: Wald Tests of Nonlinearity of Wages in GPA
(Dependent variable is normalized ability measure)
Note: Estimates shown are F statistics (and p-values in brackets) from Wald tests for whether the coefficients
on higher-order polynomial terms in GPA are equal to a null of zero. See Table 3 for other notes.
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